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Executor of the Last Will and Testament
of WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased;
GRANT MACFARLANE; DANIEL
KOSTOPULOS and ADA BRIDGE,
Defendants and Appellants.
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FOR REHEARING
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of WILDA '
GAIL SWAN, deceased, THEO SWAN
HENDEE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.W ALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
Executor of the Last Will and Testament
of WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased;
GRANT MACFARLANE; DANIEL
KOS-TOPULOS and ADA BRIDGE,

Case No.
8216

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING
By its affirmance of the trial court's judgment in
this case this court has aligned itself with substantially
all of the courts of last resort in the United States which
have dealt with similar cases. Our research revealed no
case, and appellants cited no case, in which it was held
that facts similar to those here involved were insufficient
to sustain a judgment setting aside a will for fraud and
undue influence.
In their petition for rehearing appellants greatly
labor the contention that because this court, in its decision, announced the rule that the presumption of fraud

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

and undue influence arising from the basic facts in evidence can be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence
they are entitled to a new trial. Their contention is met
and completely overcome by the language of the opinion
itself.
After a full discussion of the presumption involved,
together with the nature and effect of the basic facts
which gave rise to the presumption, this court announced
the rule which, in its judgment, should apply. It did so
in the following language:
((After careful study and consideration we
conclude that this presumption shifts the burden
onto the confidential adviser of persuading or
convincing the fact finder· by a preponderance of
the evidence that no fraud or undue influence was
exerted, or in other words, he has the burden of
convincing the fact finder from the evidence that
it is more probable that he acted perfectly fair
with his confidant; that he made complete disclosure of all material information available and
took no unfair advantage of his superior position
than that he exerted fraud or undue influence to
obtain the benefits in question."
Following such announcement this court said:

rrunder such a rule we must affirm the trial
court's findings, for clearly findings that the evidence failed to convince by a preponderance of
the evidence, that no fraud or undue influence
induced these legacies, or that the existence of
such inducenzent was more improbable than it was
probable was not unreasonable in view of all of
the evidence." (emphasis ours)
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The foregoing is a clear decision that, measured by
the rule of upreponderance of the evidence" as distinguished from the uclear and convincing rule," the evidence was ample to support the trial court's :findings and
that they must be affirmed.
With Pilcher's Estate, 114 Utah 72, 197 P. (2d) 143,
and Jardine v. Archibald, 3 Utah (2d) 88, 279 P. (2d)
454, as guides it was quite natural and altogether proper
for counsel for appellee to rely upon those cases. But it
will be noted that neither in his long memorandum
decision nor in his findings and conclusions did the trial
court ever mention the measure of proof he was applying.
He made detailed findings of the basic facts which gave
rise to the presumption, but he never even mentioned the
presumption itself. Substantially all of such basic facts
in the case came into the record upon examination of
appellants. They cannot, as held by this court, be brushed
aside, and they are ample to support the judgment.
The only issues raised for consideration upon this
appeal were those specified by appellants in their original
brief on appeal. Their ((Statement of Points" is quoted:
((Point I. The evidence is insufficient to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court
that Gail Swan lacked testamentary capacity at
the times she executed the will and codicils.
((Point II. The evidence is insufficient to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court
that Gail Swan was under the force of undue
influence at the times she executed the will and
codicils."
Appellants' ((Statement of Points" constituted their
assignments of error, and they are significant at this time
because of what they do not embrace.
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No point was ever made, and no argument was ever
made, that the trial judge erroneously failed to apply the
upreponderance of evidence" rule. What appellants did
argue was that they had made a prima facie case
which destroyed the presumption as well as the effect of
the basic facts which gave rise to the presumption. That
argument was clearly rejected by this court.
No point was ever made by appellants that there
was any error in the receipt or exclusion of evidence.
A point should not be raised for the first time upon a
petition for rehearing, and yet appellants now complain
for the first time about reference during the trial to the
Becker case. And such complaint is in the face of the
fact that Macfarlane admitted upon his examination
without any objection whatsoever from counsel that he
had drawn Becker's will; that he was a beneficiary in
the will; and that a will contest had been :filed. (Reporter's Transcript 132)
The trial court in his memorandum opinion and his
extensive :findings of fact set forth in great detail all of
the facts which led him to his decision, and nowhere
did he ever mention the Becker case.
Rule 76,(e) (1) Utah Rules Civil Procedure is based
in part upon 104-41-26 of the 1943 Code. That section
has been construed by this court. In Dahlquist v. D. &
R. G., 174 Pac. 833, 52 Utah 438, at page 469, the court
said:
uPropositions 1 and 2, above stated, cannot
be considered on this application. They are new
points entirely, now brought to our attention for
the first time notwithstanding they were just as
available at the hearing on appeal, and, if relied
on, should have been presented at that time. In
4 C.J. 627, 628, the rule is stated thus:
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(( (A hearing will not be granted on the ground
that petitioner has failed to argue an important
point on the hearing. All points relied upon in
support of the case must be presented by the briefs
and arguments on appeal, and the practice of
reserving certain points to be argued subsequently,
in the event of an adverse decision, is condemned
by the courts.' "
See also, Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 Pac.
716, and Garner v. Thompson, 75 P. (2d) 168, 95 Utah
295, 298, 299.
Appellants seem to contend that because this court
held the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
of lack of testamentary capacity, the finding of fraud
and undue influence must also fail. This court gave full
consideration to that aspect of the case in arriving at its
final conclusion. The point should be held to have no
merit.
We have read all of the cases cited by appellants in
their last brief. One half of them were cited by either
appellants or respondents in their original briefs and were
considered by the court. None of the others furnishes
any justification for a rehearing in this case.
The decision of this court was announced after many
months of deliberation. It reflects an objective and most
temperate approach. It should not be disturbed.
Wherefore respondent prays that appellants' petition
for rehearing be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
PAUL H. RAY,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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